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I.  SETTING  THE  STAGE
In  August, 1990, the producer of "Miss Saigon," the hit London musical
decided to cancel its Broadway production because the U.S.-based  actors'
union denied permission  for the English lead actor to perform the play
in  New York.'  Actors' Equity, the union, issued a  statement that it  could
not "appear to condone  the casting of a  Caucasian  in  the role  of a  Eur-
asian
' ."
2 The conflict between the union and the producer produced  a cause
c~l~bre debated in  the theater community, in  the press, and inside Actors'
Equity itself. A  week after its initial decision, the union reversed  itself,
saying it  had "applied an honest and moral principle in  an inappropriate
manner."
3 After weeks of negotiations securing complete casting freedom
to  the producer,  plans  for the play  revived, but the  issue  continued  to
produce controversy and wide media coverage  for months thereafter.
* Professor,  Harvard  Law  School.  This  lecture  was  presented to  Cleveland-
Marshall Law  School  as part of its distinguished  lecture  program.  I  would like
to thank Joe Singer, Anita Allen, Jack Balkin, Larry Blum, Mary Ann Glendon,
Moshe  Halbertal, Frank  Michelman, Nell Minow,  Avi  Soifer, Elizabeth  V. Spel-
man, Zipporah  Wiseman,  Peter  Lefkowitz,  David Pointer, and  David Wiseman
for their help with this piece.
IMervyn Rothstein, Producer  Cancels "Miss Saigon"; 140 Members Challenge
Equity, N.Y. TIMES,  Aug. 9, 1990,  at C15.  The union has  authority  over all per-
formers  appearing on Broadway. Actors  from foreign  countries  need union  ap-
proval  before  appearing unless  they  are  considered  British  "stars." Michael
Kuchwara,  'Miss Saigon' Canceled Over Casting of White Actor, BOSTON  GLOBE,
Aug. 9,  1990,  at p.  79. The union said  it had  not reached  the question whether
the British actor was a "star" for these purposes. Id.
2 Id.
3 Mervyn  Rothstein, Equity Council Approves Accord on  'Miss Saigon', N.Y.
TIMES,  Sept. 18,  1990,  at C14.
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The  context  of the controversy  included  advance  ticket  sales  of $25
million;4  the  recent  election  of an African-American  mayor  concerned
about both remedying discrimination and preserving the theater indus-
try;5 the political  attack  on controversial  art by conservative  American
officials  seeking to  control  the  uses  of federal  subsidies;6 an  emerging
public conflict over attention to "politically correct" claims about racism,
sexism,  and homophobia, 7  and the  United  States Supreme  Court's  re-
pudiation of most public affirmative  action programs.8
For me, there was one more context for the debate. As I read about the
casting of "Miss Saigon," I could not help but draw connections to another
"casting" debate, closer to my home.9 The  ongoing debate over why law
school faculties remain largely white and male intensified with Professor
Derrick Bell's decision  to take  a leave without pay  until Harvard Law
School hired for its tenure-track a female law professor of color. Further
heightening the issue at Harvard, a group of law students sued the school
and  claimed that discriminatory  hiring practices  hindered their  educa-
tion. 1 0 Both "Miss Saigon" and Harvard Law School generated arguments
4Mervyn  Rothstein,  Dinkins Offers  to Help  in 'Miss Saigon' Dispute, N.Y.
TIMES,  Aug.  10,  1990,  at C3.  According to  one  observer, only  the large  advance
sales  explain  the public  controversy  over Equity's  initial objection  to casting  a
Caucasian. See Robert Armin, Miss Saigon: Not the Final Word, THEATER WEEK,
Sept.  10-16,  1990  at 37-38.  ("If Miss Saigon did  not  have  such a  tremendous
advance sale  ...  very few people outside  of the theatrical  profession would have
batted an eye over Equity's decision.")
I Mervyn Rothstein, Equity Will Reconsider Miss Saigon'  Dectsion, IN.  Y.  'IMES,
Aug.  10, 1990, at C3.
6 Frank Rich explicitly analogized the National Endowment for the Arts denial
of funding to artists depicting homoerotic and sexually explicit images with  the
Actors' Equity  decision  in  the 'Miss  Saigon'  case.  Frank Rich,  Jonathan  Pryce,
"Miss Saigon" and Equity's Decision, N.Y. TIMES,  Aug. 10,  1990, at C1.
'See  generally Louis Menand,  Illiberalisms, NEW  YORKER,  May  20,  1991,  at
10 (reviewing Dinesh D'Souza's ILLIBERAL  EDUCATION: THE  POLITICS OF RACE AND
SEX  ON CAMPUS);  See also VIRGINIA  DURR,  OUTSIDE  THE MAGIC  CIRCLE (Hollinger
F. Barnard ed.  1985) (discussing racism in the United  States).
I See,  e.g.,  City of Richmond  v. J.A. Croson  Co.,  488 U.S. 469  (1989).  But see
Metro Broadcasting,  Inc. v.  FCC,  110  S. Ct. 2997  (1990).
' Making a similar connection  to underscore his own  viewpoint, Robert  Bru-
stein, the director of the American Repertory Theater  in Cambridge,  Massachu-
setts, commented:  "Everyone's in the casting business. You have to cast a black
woman in a law school as a law professor....  You have  to cast Asians, homosex-
uals,  everyone,  in order to get sufficiently  diverse  multicultural representation.
That is what Yeats called the 'mad intellect of democracy,'  thinking that democ-
racy  means there has  to  be equal  representation  for  everything that happens."
Richard  Bernstein,  The Arts Catch  Up with a Society  in Disarray, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept.  2,  1990,  § 2, at 12.  (quoting Robert Brustein).
1o  See Debbie Howlett, Harvard  Law Hit with Bias Suit, USA  TODAY, Nov. 21,
1990, at 3A. The plaintiffs, an unincorporated student organization, claimed that
Harvard  Law  School's  faculty  hiring  practices  discriminated  against  minority
groups and thus violated a state antidiscrimination  statute and a state statute
guaranteeing equal rights in the context of contracts. The trial court granted the
defendant's motion to dismiss the case. Memorandum of Decision and Orders on
[Vol.  39:269
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about merit and about symbolism, about overcoming discrimination and
about  risks  of new  forms  of discrimination,  about  fairness  and  about
representation.  In  both  contexts,  one  side  argued  that  there  must  be
someone  hired from the minority community while the other side main-
tained that hiring must be color-blind  and merit-based.
Many arguments  in the law  school  hiring  context  echoed those  gen-
erated by the "Miss Saigon" casting controversy; see if they sound familiar
to you. Jonathan Pryce, the white English actor cast by the producer for
the role, commented:  "What is appropriate is that the best person for the
job play the role, and I think it's completely  valid that I play the role."',
2
Translated  for  law  school  hiring, this  argument  sounds  like:  "what  is
appropriate is that the best person for the job get the job; excellence must
not be sacrificed for other purposes."
About "Miss Saigon," Frank  Rich commented:  "By  refusing to permit
a white actor to play  a Eurasian  role, Equity  makes  a mockery of the
hard-won principles of non-traditional casting and practices a hypocritical
reverse racism."' 3 Similarly, though perhaps less vividly, professors have
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Other Pending Motions, Harvard Law School
Coalition  for Civil Rights v. The  President and Fellows of Harvard  College,  No.
90-7904-B  (Superior Court  Feb.  22,  1991).  Curiously, in  light of the themes  of
this article, the decision largely  rested on conclusions that the students could not
represent the interests of minority members who might be victims of employment
discrimination  by the law  school. Thus, the  court ruled that the plaintiff group
lacked legal  capacity to sue; that it lacked  standing to assert the claims of any
person wrongfully denied employment  by the school; and that it could not assert
a  breach  of contract  regarding  existing  contracts  between  the  school  and  its
faculty, nor a breach regarding  nonexistent  contracts with minority candidates.
Id.
11  Two  law professors  have  commented  from contrasting  perspectives  on  the
analogy  between  the "Miss  Saigon"  controversy and  minority preference  policy
in comparative licensing proceedings undertaken by the Federal Communications
Commission. Compare Charles Fried, Metro Broadcasting,  Inc. v. FCC: Two Con-
cepts of Equality, 104 HARV.  L.  REV.  107, 121-122 n.82  (1990) with Patricia Wil-
liams, Metro Broadcasting,  Inc. v. FCC: Regrouping  in Singular  Times; 104 HARV.
L.  REV. 525  (1990).
For a thorough  and provocative  treatment of the law  school hiring issue, see
Duncan Kennedy, A Cultural Pluralist  Case for Affirmative Action in Legal Aca-
demia, 1990 DUKE  L.J. 705.
12  Mervyn Rothstein, Producer  Cancel's 'Miss Saigon'; 140 Member Challenge
Equity, N.Y. TIMES,  Aug. 9,  1990, at C15.
13  Frank Rich,  Jonathan Pryce, "Miss Saigon" and Equity's Decision, N.Y.
TIMES,  Aug.  10,  1990, at Cl,  C3. He  continued:  "This is  a policy  that if applied
with  an  even  hand would  bar Laurence  Olivier's  Othello, Pearl  Bailey's  Dolly
Levi,  and the appearances of Morgan Freeman in 'The Taming of the Shrew' and
Denzel  Washington  in  'Richard  III...'"  Id. at C3.  Some  warn  that cross-race
casting should proceed  asymmetrically  and allows  historically  excluded  groups
the  chance to  play the  majority  of existing  roles  without allowing  historically
privileged groups opportunities to play the relatively more scarce minority roles.
See Ellen Holly, Why the Furor  Over "Miss Saigon" Won't Fade, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
26,  1990, § 2, at 7 (criticizing the casting of whites into the occasional roles calling
for minorities).
1991]
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argued that demanding the appointment of a professor because of her sex
and  race  contravenes  hard-fought  principles  of equal  opportunity  and
color-blindness.
14 Even  more directly  on point  were  arguments  over  a
hiring controversy at Harvard a few years back: when white civil rights
activists and black civil rights lawyers were invited as visitors to teach
a course on civil  rights, students protested  the school's failure  to hire a
full-time  faculty  member  of color  for such  a course.  In its  defense,  the
Harvard administration challenged the idea that a white person who had
devoted his life to the subject could  not teach about civil rights.
1 5
In contrast, Ellen Holly, a black actress, commented  about the "Miss
Saigon" casting debate:
Racism in America today is nothing so crass as mere hatred of
a person's skin color. It is rather an affliction of so many cen-
turies' duration that it permeates  institutions to the point of
becoming indivisible  from them. Only when the darker  races
attempt to break out of the bind  - and inconvenience  whites
in the process  - do whites  even perceive  racism as an issue.
Only when a white is asked to vacate  a role on racial grounds
does the matter become  a front-page  issue.
16
Rich,  and  others,  also  argued  that opposing  the  casting of one  lead part in
"Miss Saigon"  was counterproductive  because the  production of the play  would
itself open  34  Asian,  black,  and Hispanic  roles  in the  musical, and  not  all, he
claimed,  would be minor roles. Rich, supra at C3. Shirley Sun responded to this
argument: "One wonders if anyone would have advised black actors to be content
with minor roles in the current Broadway production  of August Wilson's "Piano
Lesson"  if a Caucasian  actor had been  cast in the  lead as Boy Willie."  Shirley
Sun, For Asians Denied Asian Roles,  "Artistic Freedom" Is No  Comfort, N.Y.
TIMES,  Aug. 26,  1990,  § 2, at 7. Still  a different  response would query  why Rich
or  anyone else  thinks  that the  other  roles  depicting racial  minorities  are  any
more likely  to be  cast with nonwhite actors,  or any more  appropriately  so,  and
if so, why.
14 See, e.g.,  Randall Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102  HARV.
L. REV.  1745  (1989); Abigail M. Thernstrom, On the Scarcity of  Black Professors,
COMMENTARY  22,  25 (July 1990).  Cf. Kathleen Sullivan,  Speech to the Harvard
Law School Visiting Committee, March  15, 1991  (discussing reporter Lisa Olsen's
charge of sexual harassment in the men's locker room of the Patriot football team
and  acknowledging  that some people  don't think a woman reporter belonged  in
the men's  locker room. Sullivan then noted that on that theory, perhaps women
would not belong  at Harvard Law School,  either.)
"5  To round  out the analogy, one could simultaneously  have  argued that just
as African Americans teach contracts and tax, whites should be allowed  to teach
about race relations. Yet this argument has the awkward implication that teach-
ing contracts  and tax  are "white"  roles and  teaching  about  race  relations  is  a
"minority" role.
16 Ellen Holly, Why the Furor  Over "Miss Saigon" Won't Fade,  N.Y. TIMES,  Aug.
26, 1990,  § 2, at 7, 27.  Similar points appeared in testimony before the New  York
City Commission on Human Rights. Al Levine, a Hofstra University law professor,
testified that "an all-black cast of 'Oh, Kay!' does not eliminate a history of racial
discrimination." Reprinted in Thomas Walsh, NYC Hearings  on Theater Discrim-
ination Uncover Anger & Demands for Action,  BACK  STAGE  Dec.  14, 1990,  at  1
(quoting A]  Levine).  Bernard  Marsh,  an actor, criticized  the virtually  all-white
casts of contemporary Broadway  productions and noted, "We're trained to believe
an actor is an actor. We've  found that  it only applied when  the actor is white."
Id. (quoting Bernard  Marsh).
[Vol.  39:269
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Analogously, in law school faculties around the country, individuals argue
about  institutionalized racism. Some observers argue that implicit pref-
erences  for people  who are part  of the  "old-boy network"  go unnoticed,
while preferences  for someone  from a traditionally  excluded  group pro-
voke  an uproar. Advocates for change  assert that only actual results in
hiring should count as evidence that historic exclusions are being over-
come.
From this point of view, what may look like a preference for a member
of a racial minority is really an effort to counteract a preference for whites.
But another argument for preferring members of racial minorities simply
views them as specially qualified people  for the job at hand. In the wake
of the  "Miss  Saigon" controversy, the  distinguished  playwright August
Wilson defended his demand for a black  director  for the film production
of one  of his plays. He explained:
"We are an African people who have been here since the early
17th century.  We  have a  different  way  of responding  to  the
world. We have different ideas about religion, different  man-
ners of social intercourse. We have different ideas about style,
about  language.  We  have different  aesthetics.  Someone  who
does  not share the specifics  of a culture remains  an outsider,
no  matter  how  astute  a  student  or  how well-meaning  their
intentions.  I declined  a white director not on the basis of race
but on the basis of culture. White  directors are not qualified
for the job.
1 7
Similarly,  a  professor  of  color  is  needed,  many  argue,  because  that
person  will bring  cultural  perspectives  otherwise missing  from the law
school community. That perspective will enrich the classroom, the schol-
arship,  the counseling  of students  who share that background,  and the
counseling  of students  who  do  not share  that background.  In addition,
some  law school faculty members may conclude  that their school should
hire an Hispanic professor, because the increasing numbers  of Hispanic
students  need  the  knowledge  held  by  that person  and  because  white,
Asian, and African-American  students need to see a Hispanic person in
the respected  position  at the head  of the class.  Hence  the slogan,  "No
education without representation."'
An  additional  argument arises  in the  law  school  hiring debate.  Pro-
fessors are role models, and only members of historically excluded groups
can serve  adequately  as role  models  for students of those groups, goes
this variation of the argument. 9 Some who support this position maintain
somewhat  differently  that  only  a  variety  of role  models  can serve  the
needs of all students. Thus the special pedagogical  needs of students who
17  August Wilson, 'I  Want a Black Director',  N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26,  1990, at A25;
August Wilson, I Don't Want to Hire Nobody Just 'Cause They're Black, SPIN, Oct.
1990, at 70;  71.
18 Student Posters, Bulletin Boards, Harvard Law School,  1990.
,9  Anita Allen explores the role model arguments with attention to her personal
experiences  while  identifying  the  persistence  of merit  even within role  model
claims.  See Anita  Allen, On Being a Role Model, 6  BERKELEY  WOMEN'S  L.J. 22
(1990/1991).
1991]
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are members of minority groups are distinct from and yet complimentary
to the benefit for all students from diversity among the faculty. Further,
in a distributive justice sense, the focus  on race and sex in hiring should
serve to shift resources, including the resource of academic attention, to
new  agendas for legal scholarship  and teaching.2 0  Finally, the presence
of actors of color in a play can encourage young people of color to consider
acting as a career just as professors of color can inspire non-white students
to pursue academic  careers.
Most striking to me is the parallel between those who find the entire
framework of debate unacceptable, whether in the contexts of "Miss Sai-
gon" casting  or law school hiring. Playwright David Henry  Hwang, one
of the first to complain about  the casting choice  in  "Miss Saigon," later
said that he could not choose between minority casting and the producer's
right  to  cast whom  he  wants  because  that  is  "like  asking  me to  pick
between  my father  and my mother;  I can't. It's real hard for me to pick
between  artistic  freedom  on  the  one hand  and  discrimination  on  the
other."21 Similarly, some law professors  argue that the choice cannot be
between  excellence  and diversity because both are critical. In addition,
many  reject  the  implication  that  schools  must trade  or  sacrifice  some
excellence  in  order to achieve diversity.
One person struggling with these tensions concluded that at least the
debate over the casting in  "Miss Saigon" brought the chronic difficulties
facing actors of color to public  attention. Shirley Sun, director, producer
and writer of the recent film, "Iron and Silk," defended the public attention
provoked by the stance of Actors' Equity toward "Miss Saigon." She wrote,
"a minority group should not intentionally be excluded from [a Broadway
play] with impunity  . ..  'Artistic freedom'  should not be used to exclude
any group.  If the stage is a sublime place where any actor can play any
role,  why can't an Asian  or Asian-American  play a Eurasian role?"
22 If
20 This may be more like the notions of political representation in legislatures,
and the implicit idea here  is that the representatives  will redirect resources. See
Duncan Kennedy, A Cultural Pluralist  Case for Affirmative Action in Legal Aca-
demia, 1990  DUKE  L.J. 705, 728-30.
21 Kevin Kelly, M. Butterfly, Miss Saigon and Mr. Hwang, BOSTON GLOBE,  Sept.
9,  1990,  at  B89. Journalist  Kelly  in turn  commented  that  Hwang  "might be
considered  Confucian.  'The  superior  man,' Confucius  says,  '...  does not  set his
mind for anything or against anything; what is right he will follow."'  Id.
22 Shirley Sun, For  Asians Denied Asian Roles, 'Artistic  Freedom' is No Comfort,
N.Y. TIMES,  Aug. 26,  1990, § 2,  at 7.  She concludes:
While  black actors  have progressed  to playing  Shakespeare-current  ex-
amples include  Denzel Washington as Richard III and Morgan Freeman as
Petruchio  in 'Taming  of the  Shrew'  in this summer's  Shakespeare  in the
Park program-it is erroneous to use the black example to generalize about
Asian-Americans.  Clearly, Asian-Americans  have not yet reached the stage
where  they  are taken  seriously  enough  to be  able  to play themselves  in
leading roles.  Much  less  do they have  the opportunity  to be cast  in non-
Asian  roles. Until  Asian-American  actors  can  play Hamlet or Richard III,
it is ludicrous to talk about reverse racism.
Id. at  27.
[Vol. 39:269
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theater offers the possibility that actors can entice audiences to suspend
their disbelief and be transported by crafted  illusions, why cannot more
actors have this chance to transport the audience?23 The casting decision
in "Miss Saigon," then was not about matching the actor's race with the
character's  race, but about  the magical creation of an illusion of reality
Especially  noteworthy here  is the reminder that different  groups of people of
color  have  different  experiences  dealing  with  racism.  At  the  same  time,  this
comment  elides  the  difference  between  the  actors  and  the  roles  they  play  by
characterizing  playing  Asian  characters  as  playing  "themselves."  I  was  most
struck on this front by an experimental reading of the transcript of a documentary
film  by Frederick Wiseman  staged by actors of the American  Repertory Theater
in Cambridge, Ma. 1988. The actors had never seen the movie, and they performed
the  scenes and  then they joined the  audience  in  watching the  scenes  from the
movie.  Some uncanny resemblances  occurred, as when one actress decided to play
with  a rubber  band  nervously and  then turned  to  watched  the  film clip  which
showed  the actual woman  who  uttered the lines  in real  life was chewing  gum
nervously  as  she spoke. But more striking were the differences.  One of the real
characters  had made some racist statements; in the film clip, he seemed demonic
and worked up. The actor reading the lines chose instead to read them flat, with
little affect. The audience agreed that this effort by the actor was believable and
more  chilling than  the  racist statements  made by  the  actual  person  who  had
originated the lines.
Perhaps  the  point about "depicting  ourselves"  may be  somewhat different  if
the question involves  a actor with disabilities. Perhaps there  is a kind  of knowl-
edge and ease that is enabled only by having the disability, or perhaps there is
a possibility  of believable  portrayal that the actor with a disability  uniquely has
to offer. It is tempting to argue that so few have the  chance to play any theatrical
role or be taken seriously  for any role of a character  without  a disability. When
the few roles calling for a person with disabilities are given out to someone without
those disabilities,  the  rare  opportunity  to perform  is eclipsed,  and  prejudice  or
ignorance about  persons with disabilities may be the reason for the decision not
to cast or even audition an actor who has a disability. See Andrea Wolper, Beyond
Tradition: Ethnic and Disabled Actors Assess the Present, Plan for the Future,
BACK  STAGE,  Feb.  23,  1990,  at  1A,  29  (producers  tell  an  actress  who  uses  a
wheelchair not to audition for the role of a person in a wheelchair  because they
feared  she would not be  strong or well  enough).  But this relative  rarity of good
roles resembles  the  situation for  Asian, African-American,  Hispanic  actors,  fe-
male actors  over the age of 40.
23 One idealized view has the actor becoming the character:  HANNA  FEINCHEL
PITKIN,  THE  CONCEPT  OF REPRESENTATION  (1967),  at 26:
Ordinarily  the  actor  in  a play  does not  claim  or  even  pretend  to  be the
authorized representative of anyone. He does not pretend to act on authority
of Hamlet, but to be Hamlet. His entire manner and appearance are directed
to  creating  the  illusion  that this  is  someone  else,  someone  whom  he  is
playing or, as we say, representing  on the stage. Id. at 26.
Even  less  romantic  views  of acting  celebrate  the  opportunity  to  convince  an
audience of an imagined world or set of possibilities.
The relative  scarcity of such  opportunities to  create  illusions  through acting
may  be  especially  painful  when  a member  of one  minority  group  is cast  as  a
member  of another minority group.  "Seret Scott, a black  actress,  became  emo-
tional  as she  told of times  when she'd agreed  to play Latinos, Asian-Americans
and Native Americans. By complying, she said, she took jobs away from actresses
from those ethnic groups." Allan  Wallach, Casting Color Aside; Must Nonwhites
be Limited to Roles  Written Specifically for Them?,  NEWSDAY, July 1,  1990, Part
1I,  at 4-5.
19911
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by whichever  actor  gains the chance  to play the role.
2 4 Some producers
specifically endorse cross-racial casting not only to give the best candidate
the chance with the role but also to enrich and challenge  the plays with
the different  dimensions that  casting choices  may  afford.
25  Similar ar-
24 Curiously, few people considered the possibility of casting a Eurasian actor
for the  role;  both  white  and  Asian  commentators  suggested that  the Eurasian
character would have to be played either as Asian or European.  Thus, the white
actor cast in the role, Jonathan Pryce, declared that "If the character is half Asian
and half European, you've got to drop down on one side of the fence  or the other,
and I'm choosing to drop down on the European side." Mervyn Rothstein, Producer
Cancels 'Miss Saigon' 140 Members Challenge Equity, N.Y. TIMES,  Aug.  9, 1990,
at C15.
No one,  to my knowledge,  argued  that it would  be best  to  have only  people
from a group unlike the one to which the character belongs play the roles in order
to  challenge  stereotypes.  This approach  could broaden  the  range of actors  and
audience  and break out of simply enacting actual lived experience. Yet analogous
argument in a legal context is unattractive:  consider the claim that members of
a given group should not be allowed to sit as judges or jurors in cases  involving
members  of that  group  because  they lack  the requisite  objectivity.  For strong
reasons rejecting such arguments see: Blank v. Sullivan & Cromwell, 418 F. Supp.
1 (S.D.N.Y.  1975);  Pennsylvania  v. Local  Union  542,  Intl.  Union  of Operating
Eng'rs, 388 F. Supp. 155  (E.D.Pa. 1974).
25 The  Non-Traditional  Casting  Project  defines  four  types  of non-traditional
casting:  (1) societal,  in which non-white  and/or female actors are cast in roles  of
characters  with their ethnicity  or  sex;  (2)  cross-cultural,  which transposes  an
entire play to  a different  culture;  (3)  conceptual,  which casts an ethnic, female,
or disabled actor in a role to  give it greater  resonance; and (4) casting of the best
actor for a role even if this departs from the script.  See generally Andrea Wolper,
Non-Traditional  Casting:  Definitions  & Guidelines,  Backtions & Guidelines,  BACK
STAGE Feb. 23,  1990, at 29.
Zelda Fichandler, the producing director at the Arena Stage Theater in Wash-
ington, D.C., has maintained that theater's task, "while not stretching credulity
to the breaking  point,  is  to  stretch  it  as far  as we  can." Zelda  Fichandler, A
Theater Should Live on the Cutting Edge, WASHINGTON  POST,  Dec.  13,  1990, at
A22.  Under  her  leadership,  that  theater  has pursued  non-traditional  casting:
actors are cast  to play roles  not written  for someone  of their race  or ethnicity.
See generally Zelda Fichandler, Casting  For  a Different Truth, AMERICAN  THEATER
May  1988, at  8.
A multiracial cast in a performance of Thornton Wilder's "Our Town" directed
by Douglas Wager at the  Arena Stage led one reviewer to comment:
standing in  a mass on the  stage, the cast's racial  mix has  seemed utterly
unexceptional,  but as the actors  begin to step into character, it's suddenly
startling. Emily and George,  the two young lovers  who will  court, marry,
and experience tragedy together, have both been cast with white performers,
but each  has been  given  a black  sibling. George's  father  is Hispanic  and
speaks with  a pronounced accent.  Nothing  whatever is made  of this. This
mix  is  casual,  but  also  crucial,  because  it  serves  to  point up  the  play's
universality with the same understatement and lack of fuss that eliminating
sets and artifice  did in that original  1938 production  [of "Our Town"].  By
suggesting that the New England village be represented on stage by a non-
specific void, Wilder made his play universal. By transforming New England
into an idealized global village in microcosm, Wager is doing the same thing.
Bob  Mondello,  Rival Revivals,  CITY  PAPER,  Nov.  30,  1990, at 30. See generally
Dan Sullivan, Colorblind Casting: It's Not Yet a Tradition:  When Black is White,
Women  Are Men, And  the Theater Is Challenging,  L.A.  TIMES,  Oct.  2,  1988,  at
[Vol.  39:269
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guments  are  offered for  entire  cross-cultural  productions,  such  as  the
Cleveland Play House presentation of the "Glass Menagerie" with a black
cast.
26
The debates over casting "Miss Saigon" and law school faculties reflect
the  prevalence  of contemporary  assumptions  about  group  differences.
They  reflect  arguments  made on behalf of historically  excluded groups
that  group  membership  serves  as  a proxy  for  shared  experiences  and
especially  common  experiences  as  victims  of societal  prejudice.  Oppo-
nents,  styled as  defenders  of neutrality, resist such arguments because
they undermine the commitment to treating individuals  as individuals.
2 7
Some opponents further charge that the call for hiring members of racial
minorities  is incoherent  if the advocates really want someone who holds
a particular, "politically correct"  view. Skin color  is  no determinant  of
such views, this argument continues, and political litmus tests for hiring
violate  academic freedom.
The volley between these sides is interminable and confusing. Certainly
no one on one side convinces many on the other. Maybe we can understand
the debates better by seeing connections to deeper confusions  about the
concept of representation  throughout our society, made especially  vivid
in legal and political contexts. Let's see how confused we  can get, or how
confused  we already are.
If treated as problems of representation, these issues must be examined
in light of the questions:  who may  speak for someone  else? What is the
difference between symbolizing or standing for another, on the one hand,
and advancing the interests of another?28 Which should a representative
50,  52 ("If the first purpose of 'non-traditional'  is to open up new jobs, the second
is  to  open  up  new  possibilities.")  Some  critics  have  attacked  such  multiracial
casting  as  distracting  and  political  while  others  suggest  that  non-traditional
casting suits classic or universal dramas but interferes with plays written about
a specific ethnic or cultural group. See Megen Rosenfeld, Theater: 1990  -The  Year
Casting  Turned a Color-Blind  Eye to the Stage, WASHINGTON  POST,  Dec. 30,  1990,
at G7; Joanne Kaufman, Acting's Not Just for Able-Bodied Whites, WALL  STREET
JOURNAL,  Jan. 4,  1990, at A12,  Cols.  1, 4 (discussing The Diary of Anne Frank
and Raisin in the Sun). Still others emphasize that non-traditional casting is not
intended to diminish opportunities for ethnic actors to play ethnic roles. See Lisa
Yoftee,  Ethnic Casting Issues Get Soapbox Treatment, AMERICAN  THEATER  Feb.
1991,  at 34.
26 See Josephine R. Abandy, A Message From the Artistic  Director,  in the CLEVE-
LAND  PLAY  HOUSE,  THE  GLASS  MENAGERIE  (Playbill,  April  4-May  7,  1989)  (an-
nouncing first professional  all black  production  of "The  Glass Menagerie"  as a
response to the need to respect multiracial and multinational  heritage).  Abandy
concludes, "I also hope that this new interpretation of Tennessee Williams' haunt-
ing play  will  offer  different  and illuminating  insights to  those  of you  who  are
familiar with it, and will open its wonders to new audiences who have never seen
it before." Id.  Reviewer Tony Mastroianni  acknowledged  that this all-black  pro-
duction reflected Abandy's  effort to remedy past neglect of the Black  community
by the Play  House, but maintained  that a better approach would be to produce
"good  new plays  by black  playwrights." Tony  Mastroianni,  The Casting Cracks
This Glass Menagerie, AKRON  BEACON  JOURNAL,  April  15,  1989, at  B5, Cols.  1-
3.
27 See Fried, supra note  11.
21 See HANNA  FEINCHEL  PITKIN,  THE  CONCEPT  OF REPRESENTATION  (1967).
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pursue? I will suggest that enduring confusion about these issues of rep-
resentation  pervades  not only controversial  hiring decisions but also  a
range of contemporary  legal issues.
One example is elected representatives. Should the representative  do
just  what  the  voters  say  they  want,  such  as  impose  no  new  taxes,  or
instead pursue what the representative understands to be the voters' real
and best interests?  Should  the representative  look like  the voters,  eat
pork  rinds  or  blintzes  or  enchiladas,  or are  these  efforts  to  mirror  or
resemble the represented irrelevant?
29
Another  example: who  should serve  on a jury and who should be dis-
qualified  as  biased or ill-equipped?  Should  all Spanish-speaking jurors
be excluded from a case involving Spanish-speaking witnesses out of fear
that these jurors  will have  special  claims  of expertise  in the  delibera-
tions-or  would  such  exclusion  deny the parties  and the society  a  full
and fairly representative jury?3 0  Who may act as a named representative
in  a class  action:  a typical  member  of the  plaintiff group,  a specially
articulate  member,  or  a  member  whose  injuries  are  exemplary  in  the
sense of displaying the full variety of those alleged by all the plaintiffs?31
When does the completion of a lawsuit preclude a  new lawsuit on the
same issue brought by different people  - when do the parties in the first
lawsuit  adequately  represent  for subsequent  possible  parties?  For  ex-
ample,  should a suit by black  firefighters suing a city for discriminatory
hiring practices preclude a new suit by white firefighters dissatisfied with
the resulting affirmative action remedy?
3 2 If the black firefighters cannot
represent white firefighters, can the city defending its practices represent
the whites?  Or should the whites have a chance for  a  new day in  court
because  their interests  were  not represented  by  either the  city or  the
black plaintiffs?
29  The Supreme Court decided to apply the Federal Voting Rights Act to state
judicial elections, (see Chisom v. Roemer, 111 S. Ct. 2354 (1991); Houston Lawyers'
Association  v.  Texas  Attorney  General,  111  S. Ct.  2376  (1991).  This  decision
prompted  the New York  Times to ask, Are Judges Representatives? N.Y. TIMES,
June  21,  1991,  at A13.  This question recalls  to mind Senator Roman Hruskas's
comment on one of President Nixon's nominees to the Supreme Court:  "Even  if
he  were  mediocre,  there  are  a lot  of mediocre judges  and people  and  lawyers.
They are entitled to a little representation,  aren't they and a little chance?"  28
CONG.  Q.  ALMANAC  159  (1970).
30 See Hernandez v. New York,  111  S. Ct. 1859 (1991)  (Kennedy, J., plurality)
(approving use of peremptory challenges  to exclude all Spanish-speaking jurors).
But see Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968) (rejecting exclusion from jury
of all those expressing religious or moral scruples about the death penalty because
such a jury would not fully represent the views of the community).  Witherspoon
was limited, however, by Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38  (1980).  See generally Ste-
phen  Gillers, Proving the Prejudice of Death-Qualified Juries After, Adams  v.
Texas, 47 U. Prrr. L. REV. 219  (1985).
31 See Kimberl6  Crenshaw, Demarginalizing  the Intersection of Race and Sex:
A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination  Doctrine, Feminist Theory and
Antiracist  Politics, 1989 U. CHI.  LEGAL FORUM  139, 143-150  (discussing decisions
denying black women as representatives  of classes asserting sex discrimination).
32 Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S.  755 (1989).
[Vol. 39:269
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When does a fiduciary fully represent the beneficiary  and when should
doubts be raised about this representation? The fiduciary may have con-
cerns that  differ  from those of the beneficiary.  This  might be  the case
with investment managers in charge of pension funds intended to benefit
some workers who have interests in the ongoing viability of the industry.
Those workers may  prefer investments  in that  industry rather than in-
vestments  with the  highest market return.33 Does the  fact  that the  fi-
duciary  is not a member of the beneficiary group affect that investment
judgment?  Would a member of the group make  a better, more represen-
tative judgment?  Or is this kind of concern for membership  irrelevant to
investment decision-making, and properly so?
When should an attorney  for tactical purposes  have certain personal
characteristics  because  these might benefit the client? Should a woman
lawyer  be  willing  to represent  a man  charged  with  rape,  and  a  black
attorney represent  a white employer charged with race discrimination?
When should  an attorney's membership  in the same  group as the client
matter  to  the  client,  or  to  a judge?  Would  it  make  a  difference  if an
argument  for gay rights is advanced by a lawyer who is "out"? Would it
make a difference  if an argument  on behalf of a person with a hearing
impairment  is made by  someone  with a hearing  impairment?34  Should
those group characteristics have an effect? Given that they  do currently
have an effect,  what tactical  choices should attorneys and clients make,
and should any ethical concerns constrain  those choices?
Finally, who can and who should speak for a child or a person physically
or mentally  unable  to speak  for herself? What if a child  faces a choice
between medical treatment or adherence to a religious belief? Who should
speak for an elderly person who cannot express a view about whether to
stay on a respirator?
11  See  Martha  Minow  & Nell  Minow, Franchise Republics: The Examples of
Shareholder Voting and Women's Suffrage, 41 FLA. L. REV.  639, 647 (1989).
31  When Michael Chatoff presented an oral argument to the Supreme Court in
a case  involving  the educational  rights of a deaf child, he became the first deaf
attorney to appear  in that Court. Barbara  Rosewicz,  Court Hears Argument  by
Deaf Lawyer, UPI, March 23,  1982, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI file.
Chatoff persuaded  the Court to grant him permission  to  use an electronic  com-
munications system that allowed him to read the questions spoken by the justices.
Charles Babcock, Deaf Attorney Argues Before High Court for Disabled  Student,
WASHINGTON  POST,  March  24,  1982,  at  A2.  Both  this technological  innovation
and  the appearance  of a deaf attorney  elicited  public attention to  the case and
dramatized  its issue which  concerned  the scope  of accommodations  required  by
public schools obligated by Federal Law to educate students with disabilities. Id.
Ultimately denying  the request for  a sign language  interpreter for the student,
the Supreme Court  nonetheless ruled that federal  law required  some  degree  of
accommodation  by the public schools. Board of Education of the Henrick Hudson
Central School  District v. Rowley,  458 U.S.  176 (1982). The Court concluded that
the federal  statutory  requirements  would be  satisfied if the state provided  suf-
ficient personalized  instruction and support services  so that the individual child
would benefit educationally. Id.
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These are hard issues. With the help of some philosophic debates I will
suggest that we have long been confused  about them.  I will then argue
that two  specific developments  in legal and  political  thought cast  new
confusion  - but also  new light  - on the problem  of representation.  I
look  first to the contributions  of people concerned  with difference,  such
as feminists and  critical race  theorists, and then to the contributions  of
a variety of scholars interested in empathy. After exploring the genuine
tension between these two emerging  schools of thought, I will return to
a  few  of the legal  questions  I  have just  mentioned  about who  can and
who should  represent another. And perhaps,  I will  also get a  chance to
return to theater  before I  am done.
II.  PRESENTING  REPRESENTATION
To  deal  thoughtfully  with  confusion,  I  like  to turn  to  philosophers,
especially  analytic philosophers.  It is not that I understand  them. It is
that they  are  so clear  about their confusion,  so the rest of us can relax
about ours. Thus, if an analytic philosopher  applies the clarifying  tools
of careful study  of words  and their meanings, distinctions and their ap-
plications, and analogies and their limitations, and the subject still seems
confusing, the reader may conclude with some confidence that the concept
just is confusing. Such,  I maintain, is with representation  as a concept,
and I proffer the elegant  book on the subject by Hanna Feinchel Pitkin
as  evidence.
3 5 Many contrasting meanings  gather  in the crevices  of the
word, "representation."  Two  contrasting consequences  result. Efforts to
pin down distinctive meanings may founder as the meanings shade into
and evoke one another. Efforts to clarify the concept may instead convert
ideal versions of representation into merely definitional notions. Pitkin's
ambitious historical and analytic treatment of the concept helps to depict
and describe these confusing dimensions of the notion, representation, as
she runs  circles  around the  concept and  also shows that the concept is
often circular as used.
Professor  Pitkin identifies  the relatively  modern  use  of the concept,
and  notes that the  ancient  Romans  used  a similar  word  to  mean  the
literal bringing into presence  something previously  absent, or the  em-
bodiment  of an  abstraction  in  an object.36 She  then distinguishes  two
dominant  contemporary  views  of representation:  the  person  who  does
what is best for those in his charge and the person who reflects accurately
the wishes and opinions of those he is assigned to represent.
3 7 But beyond
3  PITKIN,  supra note 28.
36Id. at 3.
Id. at 4. A representative  could fulfill both of these views if the client's wishes
match up with  the representative's  views of the client's best interests. This ob-
servation need not merely  reflect  the banal  effect of coincidence  because  on  oc-
casion, the representative  may  conclude that the client's  best interests  call  for
expressing or deferring to the client's express views.
[Vol. 39:269
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this conceptual distinction, Professor Pitkin demonstrates the inadequacy
of any single definition  for the concept.
3 8
Pitkin specifies  and  contrasts  four divergent  definitions  and  she  si-
multaneously  explores  their  mutual  influences  and  internal  tensions.
First, a formal definition  looks to the authorized arrangement  preceding
and  initiating  the  creation  of a representative. 9 Pitkin  criticizes  this
notion as circular; it lacks both any directive about the actual task to be
performed and any measure of accountability  for the performance of that
task.4 0  In a second definition, representation  refers to the notion  of like-
ness, mirror, map or portrait. Representing here depends not on authority,
accountability, or any  kind of acting, but instead on the representative's
characteristics  and ability to "stand for" those he represents.4'  This def-
inition has a measure of the representative's  success:  it is the verisimi-
litude  or believability  of the representation.  Because  it turns  on the
personal  characteristics  of the  representative  rather  than  any  actions
taken, this concept resembles the emphasis on appearance in the debates
over hiring in "Miss  Saigon" and law  school faculties.
42
The emphasis on  accuracy  in this second definition  is problematic. A
fully  accurate  depiction  is probably impossible,  even  in art (where this
may not even be the goal).43 Because  of this impossibility, other dimen-
sions of representation  may  operate  under the  name of appearance  or
38  See, e.g.,  id., at 10,  53,  75, 87,  90,  115,  142.
1
9 Id.  at 11,  27.
4.Id. at 28, 35,  39,  49.  For this reason,  Pitkin finds  the concept incomplete if
not unworkable even by those, like Thomas Hobbes, who advocated the formalist
definition. Id., at  28,  35.  Hobbes  wishes  to use the  concept of representation  to
resolve  how people with separate and  conflicting wills could live in peace. Id. at
35.
"'  Id.  at 61.
42  Yet the fact that a resemblance  must be believed by others raises troubling
questions  about  the role  of attitudes  and concepts  in  constructing what  people
think is real. A white actor may be "made up" to  look Asian. A person  who may
appear  white  may  instead  be African-American.  See Ken Johnson,  Being and
Politics,  ART IN AMERICA,  Sept. 1991 at 155. Johnson describes a video installation
by Adrian  Piper  entitled  "Cornered."  The  work  begins  by confronting  viewers
with a video of Piper who
does not appear to be black  - she has neither the skin color nor the char-
acteristic facial features of someone of obvious African descent. And so she
begins by announcing, 'I'm  black.' Then, in a coolly authoritarian  tone she
suggests,  'Now  let's deal with this social fact and the fact of my  stating it
together.'
Id. at 155-56. This work of art includes philosophic  arguments and suggests that
the questions  it raises  might help  viewers  to  alter  their  understandings  of
"reality." See id. at 156.
43  PITKIN, supra  note 28, at 66-69, 87. And for depictions intended to be accurate
"representations"  such as a map or blueprint, the thing itself must be  read and
interpreted.  Id. at  86.  Some values and guides outside the representation  itself
become critical  in assessing its usefulness. See MICHAEL  J.  SHAPIRO,  Preface,  in
the POLITICS  OF REPRESENTATION:  WRITING PRACTICES  IN  BIOGRAPHY,  PHOTOGRA-
PHY, AND  POLICY  ANALYSIS XI  (1988)  ("representations do not imitate reality but
are the practices through which  things take on meaning  and value").
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imitation.  Professor Pitkin notes: "As  soon as the correspondence  is less
than perfect, we must begin to question what sorts of features and char-
acteristics  are  relevant  to  action,  and  how  good  the  correspondence  is
with regard to just those features."
4  Choosing which traits to make rel-
evant  raises  questions  of authorization  or  substitution.  Alongside  the
shortfall between ideal resemblance  and limited resemblance  is the gap
between the ideal and the real representative in other senses. The use of
one trait rather than others as a basis for resemblance  further confuses
the relationship between ideal and real. "We tend to assume that people's
characteristics  are  a  guide  to the  actions  they  will  take, and  we  are
concerned  with the characteristics  of our legislators for just this reason.
But it is no simple correlation; the best descriptive  representative  is not
necessarily  the best representative  for activity or government.."45 As this
statement by Pitkin suggests,  there is something slippery and thus mis-
leading in  the use  of a term  like representation.  One  of its meanings
slides into its other meanings without consistency or reliability. Similarly,
talking about a representative in terms of a likeness may imply something
that is typical. Yet, this too may be unsatisfactory, for the concept does
not address along which lines the representative is to be typical. In asking
for a representative  poem,  we may not mean  a typical  one but instead
the best one, the best example. Similarly, people often  choose  represen-
tatives who  are not typical of the class they represent.4 6
Besides the formal definition  of authorized  representation and the def-
inition of descriptive likeness, a third meaning of representation, as noted
by Pitkin, refers to symbolic substitution. The flag stands for the nation.
The  symbol "x"  stands for the unknown quantity of apples;  "pi" stands
for plaintiff. This notion  of a  symbol,  if freighted  with  meaning,  may
explain  why a  leader who  is not  accountable  or typical  is  nonetheless
sometimes described as a representative; that leader may in some respect
be  a  symbol of the polity, the community, or the beliefs of those repre-
sented.47 This definition, however, lacks  any guide for what a represen-
tative is to do or how one could judge the performance of  a representative. 4 8
Pitkin's fourth  definition  actually  is  a  range of analogies  to  roles
through  which  an  individual  may  provide,  care,  or  speak  for  another.
Actor, trustee, deputy, agent, steward  - these are all notions with dif-
44  PITKIN,  supra note 28, at 88.
41 Id. at 89. Unfortunately,  at this point Pitkin  offers the example,  from Grif-
fiths, of a lunatic who may be the best descriptive  representative  of lunatics, but
"one would not suggest that they be allowed  to send some of their number to the
legislature."  Id. Since members of the mental patient rights movement may sug-
gest something similar to this concept  in urging representation  of former mental
patients  on  governing  bodies  affecting mental  patients,  this passage  seems  at
best outdated.
41 Id. at 75-80, 90.
'
7  PITKIN,  supra note 35, at 103-05. 48 1Id. at 112-13.
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ferent shades of meaning pertinent to the idea of speaking for another.4 9
But the selection of which of these terms to accept as an analogy replicates
the central  ambiguity  within the notion of representation  itself: should
the  representative  do  what  the  represented  party  wants  or  what  the
representative thinks is best?5 0 Professor Pitkin notes how tilting to either
extreme risks eliminating the very role of the representative.  Doing en-
tirely what the represented party wishes converts the representative into
a mere conveyer of information, while doing only what the representative
thinks is best risks eliminating  any connection,  obligation,  or account-
ability to the represented party.5 1  It  is not enough,  according  to Pitkin,
for  the representative  to  choose  whether  or not  to  pursue the  client's
wishes.  To be a representative, it is necessary  also that such  choices be
justifiable. 2  And yet this very notion of justification  simply reopens the
question of what values or standards to use in measuring representation.
Talk  of the interests, and  even the  objective interests of those repre-
sented is tempting when evaluating a representative, but the ambiguities
and  assessment difficulties  with this set of concepts  are  notorious.53 In
Professor Pitkin's analysis, different theories of interests reflect contrast-
ing political conceptions  of good, justice, knowledge, and social class and
social solidarity.54 She concludes that:
4 Id. at 125-43.  Edmunde Burke's  theory of representation,  which Pitkin ex-
plores at length, emphasizes  the judgment of the representative  while pursuing
the constituents'  interests:
it  is our duty  when we have the desires  of the people before  us, to pursue
them, not in the spirit of literal  obedience,  which may militate with their
very  principle,  much  less  to treat  them  with  a peevish  and  contentious
litigation, as if we were adverse parties in a suit....  I cannot indeed take
upon me  to say I have honour to follow the sense of the people.  The truth
is, I met it on the way, while I was pursuing their interest according to  my
own ideas.
EDMUNDE  E.  BURKE,  WORKS  AND  CORRESPONDENCE  VOL.  III at 354 (emphasis  in
the original (London; Rivington,  1852).
so  See, supra  note  28, at 145,  153. Pitkin calls this the mandate-independence
controversy.
51 See id. at 153,  163-64.
All of these elements-what  is  to be  represented, whether it is objectively
determinable, what the relative  capacities  of representative  and constitu-
ents are,  the nature  of the  issues to be  decided,  and  so on-contribute  to
defining  a theorist's position on the continuum between 'taking care of'  so
complete  that  it is  no  longer  represented,  and  'delivering  their  vote'  so
passive that it is at most a descriptive 'standing  for.' Id. at 214.
52 See PITKIN supra note 28, at 164.  So when the representative  feels in conflict
with the  express  orders of those represented,  this fact calls for  considering the
reasons  for  the discrepancy  and may  call for a reconsideration  of the represen-
tative's views. Id. at  164-65.
See Pitkin, supra note 28, at 156-62.
r4 Compare PITKIN,  supra note 28,  at 173-74  (discussing Burke) with PITKIN,
at  195 (discussing Madison).
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[t]he  more  a  writer  sees  interest[s],  wants,  and the  like  as
definable  only by the person who feels or has them, the more
likely  he is  to require that  a representative  consult his con-
stituents  and act in response to what they ask of him. At the
extreme, again, substantive  acting for others becomes  impos-
sible,  and  a theorist  must either fall  back on  other views  of
representation  or declare the concept an illusion.
55
Ultimately, the representative  quality  of given  persons or institutions
turns on their capacities  to justify themselves to those who are allegedly
represented  or  who  otherwise  care.56  Again  circularity  of the  concept
appears; "representative" means what others are convinced it means. So
if you and I are confused about how to measure or check whether someone
is a good  representative  or whether a representative  function  is appro-
priate  to a given  role,  we  are in good company.  Pitkin's work  at least
affords vocabulary for naming the possible meanings that are afloat amid
the confusion.
B.  The Historical  Moment For The Question
Not just confusion but also conflict over the meaning of representation
emerges  now in the face of two recent movements in scholarly circles.
The first I will call difference theory; it has been pursued  especially by
feminists  and  critical  race  theorists.  They  have  questioned  the  use  of
abstract universal terms or norms by showing how implicitly those terms
or norms actually embrace the particular experiences or interests of those
in positions of sufficient authority or dominance to govern. However much
universal and abstract norms may once have advanced a democratic and
anti-hierarchical  agenda, 57 in current  operation such ideas often  fail to
reflect  - fail to represent  - the experiences, interests, and needs of the
full  variety  of human beings.  Thus, traditional  norms  of equality and
liberty may  have  well-suited  white  Christian men  without  disabilities
but often disadvantaged  any who  depart from that particular  identity
and experience.  Freedom from the establishment of a religion, according
to the Supreme Court, is not violated by public displays of a Christmas
creche  when combined  with secular symbols.58 For non-Christians, this
55Id. at 210.
56 See id. at 240.  Perhaps Pitkin herself became  confused  here, or tempted to
blend the related but distinct questions of what it means to  be a representative
and what it means to  be a good representative.
51 See STEPHEN  HOLMES,  The Secret History of Self Interest, in BEYOND  SELF
INTEREST  267, 284 (Jane J. Mansbridge  ed.,  1990).
58  See Lynch  v.  Donnelly,  465  U.S.  668  (1984).  In subsequent  decisions,  the
Court further confused matters by rejecting as a violation of the Establishment
Clause a display that lacked any secular figures, while approving a display that
combined a Christmas tree with a Chanukah menorah. Allegheny  v. ACLU, 492
U.S. 573 (1989).
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"neutral" rule does  not feel  neutral. (Indeed, observant  Christians, too,
may be insulted  by treatment of a significant religious holiday that ren-
ders both Santa and Jesus  as simply shopping mall decorations.)59
Similarly, equal  protection against discrimination  on the basis of sex
is not violated, again according to the Supreme Court, where an employer
refuses  to include pregnancy in its insurance  coverage, because not only
men but also some  women are not pregnant at any given time.6 0  Again,
from the perspective  of many women, this decision  seems  a bit peculiar
and reflective of something other than women's experiences. A rule about
what constitutes rape that requires a victim to fight back physically but
does not take her verbal "no" as sufficient resistance reflects traditionally
male  rather than traditionally  female  understandings  of sexuality and
of self-defense. 61 Let  me try one  more:  a  rule guaranteeing  freedom  to
enter into binding contracts  may  look neutral.
6 2 But if it lacks any pro-
hibition against racially discriminatory treatment within those contracts,
anyone in jeopardy of discrimination on the basis of race would view this
as a perversely  crabbed interpretation  of freedom  of contract. Nonethe-
less, this is the Supreme Court's present view.
Theorists  of difference  have  taken  such  examples  and explored  how
apparently neutral, abstract rules written without the perspective of some
end up implementing  the perspectives of others.63 Advocates  for persons
with disabilities have been  especially effective  in this critique  recently.
They have demonstrated  how historic efforts restraining the use of sign
language  so that profoundly  deaf people could  fit into the larger society
actually denied those  people meaningful  language.64 They have  pointed
out how buildings  that are inaccessible  to  people who  use wheelchairs
are not  neutral but disabling,  and  how mass  transit systems  that are
hazardous  to  people  with  visual  or  hearing  impairments  are  also  not
neutral but instead reflect the kinds of persons for whom they were clearly
designed.
65
If we think about people excluded by such social institutions and rules,
two cautionary  rules emerge. First, claims to know what others want or
59  See David  Cobin, Creches, Christmas Trees and Menorahs: Weeds Growing
in Roger Williams' Garden, 1990  Wis. L. REV. 1597,  1609-10.
60  Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
61 SUSAN  ESTRICH,  REAL RAPE  29-56 (1987).
62 See Patterson v. McLean  Credit Union, 491  U.S.  164 (1989).
- See CATHERINE  MACKINNON,  FEMINISM  UNMODIFIED  1-5  (1987);  MARTHA  Mi-
NOW,  MAKING ALL  THE  DIFFERENCE:  INCLUSION,  EXCLUSION, AND  AMERICAN  LAW
(1990);  Patricia  Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructed Ideals from Decon-
structed Rights, 22  HARV.  C.R.-C.L.  L.  REV.  401  (1987).  Cf  PIERRE  CLASTRES,
SOCIETY AGAINST  THE STATE  (1989) (criticizing anthropological  accounts that treat
as universal the particular cultural patterns of the anthropologist's own society).
See OLIVER  SACKS,  SEEING  VOICES 25-26 (1989).
65 See  Robert L.  Burgdorf, Jr.,  The Americans with Disabilities  Act: Analysis
of a Second Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.  413,  418-
19,  460-63,  470-81  (1991).
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need  are suspect if made without the basis of shared experiences  along
the lines of the trait used for past exclusions. Translation: You don't know,
and you get it wrong. This is what the excluded group is likely to say to
those outside their group who claim to speak for them. Secondly, claims
to  speak  for  others  by  people  not  in the  group  are  vulnerable  on  the
grounds that participation itself is a value and the process of representing
a  viewpoint is an exercise  of power  that should be  enjoyed  by those  on
whose behalf the exercise  is claimed.  Perhaps  no representative  can be
fully able to know the interests of everyone in the group. But as a political
matter, the group may want to give the benefit of the doubt to a member
of the group. It is a matter of trust. Translation:  We speak for ourselves
and thus one of us should do the speaking. Speaking expresses power; it
is empowering; and speaking for others depends upon their trust.
The difference critique is associated with what can be called "identity
politics.
'66  Some of its exponents call  for proportional representation  in
the  electoral  context.  Some  of its opponents,  and  even  some  who  sym-
pathize, raise  pointed objections. How  many differences  now need to be
represented? Must the African-American caucus divide along gender lines
and the  gender caucus divide  along racial lines, and all  of them divide
further along the lines of sexual orientation, disability, and religion?  If
so, how can any political movement  emerge? 6 7 Others challenge the  im-
plicit claim that sociological  traits of a person  match  interests or pref-
erences  and still others worry  about the  conflicts between  notions  of
identity as natural or fixed and notions of identity as personally chosen
or socially constructed. 68
But this is simply a glimpse of the debates internal to this movement.
The  difference critique endures and affords an angle on problems  of rep-
resentation. Indeed, the rules and practices  about given forms of repre-
sentation may be vulnerable to the criticism that they veil, in the guise
of a false universalism,  the particular views  and interests  of some. For
those rules and practices, justifiable representation may call for attention
to the two claims: (1) you don't know, and you get us wrong;  and (2)  we
speak for ourselves. 6 9
- See generally IRIs YOUNG,  JUSTICE  AND THE  POLITICS OF  DIFFERENCE  156-91
(1990).
67 See  ELIZABETH  V.  SPELMAN,  INESSENTIAL  WOMAN:  PROBLEMS  OF EXCLUSION
IN  FEMINIST  THOUGHT  (1988)  for an elegant  exploration of these differences  and
a call for politics based on mutual consultation  and struggle.
61  See Steven Epstein, Gay Politics,  Ethnic Identity: The Limits of Social Con-
structionism, 17  SOCIALIST  REVIEW  10  (May-August  1987)  (identifying  conflict
between  academic  arguments that gay  identity is fluid and socially constructed
and political  argument that gay identity is natural and determined).
69 There could  be  additional  claims:  (3)  You  do know,  and you  do  us wrong
(deliberate racism, etc.); (4) it's our turn to do for ourselves (nationalism response);
(5)  only  with  a representative  from  our group  can  we  each have  the  vicarious
experience  of speaking and being there. Thanks to Anita Allen and Moshe Hal-
bertal for these points.
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C.  The Challenge Of Empathy
A  second and contrasting challenge to notions of representation  ques-
tions the assumption that people  cannot  justifiably  speak  for others  be-
cause they have sharply distinct and conflicting interests. That we each
have distinct and conflicting interests is a familiar, liberal idea. The idea
that we  are  each  self-interested  monads  abounds,  although  it has  not
been powerful  enough to  preclude  many  models and forms  of represen-
tation in law and politics. At least since  Hobbes, the problem that rep-
resentation  was  supposed  to  solve  rested  on  a  view  that  humans  are
separate  and have conflicting wills.
7 0  Moreover,  where theories  of liber-
alism, democracy, and relativism dominate, as they have in recent Amer-
ican culture, people  "tend to think that, in the last analysis, each man
has the right to define his own  good, and if he rejects  something, no one
has the right to insist that it  is good for him."7' Representation,  on this
view, is  appropriate  only for  people who  know their  own interests  and
who can find an agent with no clashing interests.72
But maybe, just maybe, the idea that we are all basically self-interested
is wrong. This is the kind of doubt posed by the second new development
in scholarship  that challenges  rules of representation.  Some  feminists,
some humanists, and some  self-styled communitarians join a variety  of
people  who think it wrong  or incomplete  to  think  of people  as  simply
separate,  autonomous,  and  self-interested.  I  will  call  these  people  the
70 See PITKIN, supra note 28, at 35 (discussing Hobbes). Note: Hobbes expressly
excluded wives  and "property" which encompassed slaves.
"'  PITKIN, supra note  28, at 159. Pitkin notes further that children  and others
who are thought not to be able to know their own interests cannot be represented;
instead,  others  take care  of them. "Representation  enters  the picture  precisely
where  the  person  acted  for  is  conceived  as  capable  of acting  and judging for
himself; and of such a person we assume that he will want what is in his interest."
Id. at  162.  This  does, however,  lead to paradoxical  ideas  about who  exactly  is
competent to know his own interests; for if someone wants something that others
think is not in his interest, the others may conclude  he is not competent to know
his interests  and thus to  select  a representative  to advance  them. See  Martha
Minow,  Why  Ask  Who Speaks for the Child: Review of Gaylin & Macklin,  Who
Speaks for the Child; The  Problems of Proxy Consent, 53  HARV.  ED.  REv.  444
(1983).
72 For a thoughtful  article  challenging  this view  in the context of legal rep-
resentation for children see Stephen Wizner & Miriam Berkman, Being a Lawyer
for a Child Too Young to be a Client:  A Clinical  Study, 68 NEB. L. REv. 330 (1989).
The authors describe three  complex cases  in which  they represented young chil-
dren in custody and visitation cases following their parents' divorces, and develop
a set of presumptions for guiding lawyers in such situations to assure  children's
protection in  and from the  litigation process  itself. They further  call  for inves-
tigation  by  the  lawyer into  the  child's actual  interests  and  advocacy  of those
interests. In a sense, such lawyers not only represent  but also  enact or embody
the interests of children;  the lawyer for a child assures distinct attention to the
person who might otherwise be neglected or used by adults.
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empathy advocates. They argue that people  (1) often want to care about
the good of others (altruism) and (2)  have the ability to understand and
know the wants and needs of others (empathy).
7 3  The empathy advocates
also argue that individuals act out of duty, love, and malevolence  as well
as self-interest, and that  "people often  take account  of both  other indi-
viduals' interests and the common good when they decide what constitutes
a  'benefit'  that they  want to  maximize.
7 4  Works  by  Amartya  Sen  in
economics,  J.G.A.  Pocock  in  history, and  Carol Gilligan  in  psychology
indicate the  variety  of disciplines  and specific points  made  by scholars
advocating this view.
75
These  critics identify  the power  of altruism, the motivation and will-
ingness to care for and give to others with no hope of gain for oneself.
76
They point out the power of group identity, or solidarity, that enhances
cooperation  without any expectation  of future reciprocity  or current  re-
wards  or punishments.
77 They  also  explain the  malleability  of human
beings, and discuss how learning environments and social arrangements
can  reinforce  either  selfishness  or sharing  and  altruism.
78  They  have
confidence  in  at least  some  cognitive and emotional capacities  we each
have to resonate  and identify others. Translation:  (1)  Don't be so sure  I
don't care to understand you or cannot understand you, and (2)  give me
a chance  or else you're the one who ensures that we'll just all be selfish.
If these critics are onto something, they too provide  a set of questions
to test existing rules and practices about representation. If people already
can take the perspective  of others and care for them, then maybe people
who  are not like  me can nonetheless  represent me. And if  people learn
71  See  LAWRENCE  A. BLUM,  FRIENDSHIP, ALTRUISM,  AND MORALITY  (1980).
14  JANE  J.  MANSBRIDGE,  BEYOND  SELF  INTEREST at ix,  x  (1990).  Mansbridge
suggests that this approach involves in part a return  to pre-modern  understand-
ings while also preserving the insights of modern  social science.
71  See,  e.g.,  CAROL  GILLIGAN,  IN  A  DIFFERENT  VOICE  (1982);  J.G.A.  POCOCK,
THE  MACHIAVELLIAN  MOMENT  (1975);  and Amartya  K. Sen,  Rational Fools: A
Critique  of  the Behavioral  Foundations  of Economic Theory, in SCIENTIFIC MODELS
AND  MEN  317-44 (H. Harris ed.,  1978). 76 E.g.,  ALFIE  KOHN,  THE  BRIGHTER  SIDE  OF  HUMAN  NATURE:  ALTRUISM  AND
EMPATHY  IN  EVERYDAY  LIFE  (1990);  Virginia  Held,  Mothering vs.  Contract, in
BEYOND  SELF  INTEREST  287, 294 (Jane J.  Mansbridge  ed.  1990).
77  Robyn  M.  Dawes  et  al.,  Cooperation  for the Benefit of Us-Not Me, or my
Conscience, in BEYOND  SELF  INTEREST 97,  99 (Jane J. Mansbridge  ed.,  1990).
71  KOHN, supra note 76, at 118-204 (discussing social science research indicat-
ing that predispositions  to  share  and to be selfish  can  be  reinforced or  snuffed
out); Jane J.  Mansbridge,  The Rise and Fall of Self-Interest in the Explanation
of Political  Life, in BEYOND SELF-INTEREST 3, 20-21 (Jane J. Mansbridge ed.,  1990)
(describing James Buchanan who  won the Nobel Prize in economics  for applying
to economics a rational choice model based on self-interest and then "repudiated
the single motive of self-interest in favor of looking at context" and interdepend-
ence  between people  and rules and  institutions, concluding that "we  should try
to design institutions to encourage  motivations we believe on normative grounds
are either good  in themselves or will lead to  good and just outcomes").
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and  grow  more  or  less  empathetic  toward  others  depending  upon  the
worlds  and  others  they encounter, then  maybe  we should  bet on  rules
predicated  on  empathy instead  of rules presumed  on narrow self-inter-
est.
7 9
Have you noticed that these questions point in quite different directions
for the inquiry prompted by the difference critics? ° The difference critics
call for skepticism about the possibility of representation  by people who
are not themselves members  of the represented  group. They remind us
that representatives often get it wrong. They remind us that participation
itself is a value and should be enjoyed  by members  of the actual groups
that have  not  been  allowed  to  speak  for  themselves  in  the  past.  The
empathy advocates in contrast urge greater confidence  in people's capac-
ity  to care  for others and  also recommend  reconstructing  rules and in-
stitutions  to  expect and  reinforce  that capacity. They  remind us of the
possibility that people  can be other-regarding,  and  the possibility that
societal  rules affect this very possibility.  How about that for confusion!
But maybe this is good confusion. Keeping  in mind contrasting  commit-
ments may make things seem complicated but also genuine and honest.s
Keeping in mind the philosopher's  confusions  about representation, I
now add the two contrasting set of inquiries as I turn to examine examples
of current rules and practices about representation. Besides pursuing the
questions prompted  by each set of criticisms, I will also try to evaluate
the probative  power of each critique in light of which problem has been
more  severe  in  each  context:  a  failure to acknowledge  differences  or  a
failure  to consider human  capacity for empathy.
III.  SCRUTINIZING  RULES  OF REPRESENTATION
I will not have time to examine each of the legal contexts of represen-
tation I mentioned at the start. But here are  two, and a mention  of the
others in hopes of prompting further discussion.
7 Contemporary  African-American  theater  often  analogously  challenges  the
assumption of a separation between audience and stage and seeks to use theater
to create  or  reinvent  cultural  unity and  militant  nationalism.  See  GENEVIEVE
FABRE,  DRUMBEATS,  MASKS,  AND  METAPHOR:  CONTEMPORARY  AFRO-AMERICAN
THEATER  104-05,  108,  218, 236-38  (1983).
80 These  questions point in quite different directions in evaluating a theory of
representation like  Edmunde  Burke's. The  difference  critique  might  well  raise
suspicions about his claims that a representative's  own judgment may be better
in pursuing constituents'  interests  than their express views, while  the empathy
critique might  provide  renewed support  for Burke. Yet  the notion  of empathy
seems  to refer  to  a  more  egalitarian  relation between representative  and  con-
stituent than Burke's elite enlightened trustee  who may sympathize with others
from a superior position. See EDMUNDE  BURKE,  III WORKS  AND  CORRESPONDENCE
354 (1852).
81  The contrasting commitments here arise along at least two dimensions. Thus,
understanding human self-interest and altruism reflects one contrast; recognizing
each individual  as the  important unit of analysis  contrasts with a  view of the
group as the important unit of concern.
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A.  Juries And Group Representation
The  Supreme  Court recently considered  "whether a prosecutor's prof-
fered  explanation  that  prospective  Latino jurors  were  struck  from the
venire because he suspected they might not abide by official translations
of Spanish language  testimony  constitutes  an acceptable  'race  neutral'
explanation"? 2 The lower court acknowledged  in this case  that the  de-
fendant  had  demonstrated  a  prima  facie  case  of discrimination.8 3  The
question  posed  was whether the government  provided  an adequate  ex-
planation  for  using its  peremptory  challenges.  The case presented  two
related problems. First, is the use of peremptory challenges that results
in a jury with apparently  no Hispanic  members a violation of an equal
protection?  And, secondly, if these challenges do produce  a jury lacking
members of Spanish heritage  is that result a constitutional  violation? 4
Earlier  cases  questioned the apparent  exclusion  of racial  and ethnic
minorities and women85 from juries and jury pools. Even when the legal
doctrine at stake is equal protection,8  the notion of representation is close
at hand. The popular conception  of the jury as a group  of peers is rooted
in the institution's origins.
87  In addition, for some period of time, English
law demanded that a suit involving a foreigner be tried by a jury composed
at least in part by  foreigners.8  Social class, country of origin, race, eth-
nicity, and gender thus each have had significance  in assuring  the rep-
resentative  fairness of a jury.
At stake  in the composition  of juries  is a  conception  of that decision-
making body as a representative cross-section of the society.89 Achieving
52 Hernandez v. New York,  111  S. Ct. 242 (1990) (granting cert. limited to this
question and a question about the proper standard of review).  The Court rejected
the challenge. Hernandez v. New York,  111  S.  Ct. 1859 (1991).
People v. Hernandez,  528  N.Y.S.2d 625 (N.Y.App.2d  1988)(citing  Batson v.
Kentucky,  476 U.S. 79  (1986)).
One prior related  case  is United  States v. Alcantar, 897  F.2d 436  (9th Cir.
1990) (remanding  for new  trial in similar case because  none of the information
regarding  exclusion or  acceptance  of jurors  was  available  to the parties  or the
court).  In Alcantar, the prosecutor objected  to  Spanish-speaking jurors because
some of the evidence  introduced  would be tape  recordings  of the defendant  dis-
cussing her crimes. Id. at 437. The prosecutor feared that Spanish-speaking jurors
would interpret the tapes different from the official  translation and, claiming a
special expertise,  influence the other jurors. Id.
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S 522 (1975); Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961);
Strauder v. West Virginia,  100 U.S.  303 (1879).
1 See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S
475 (1954).  Other similar  cases interpret the Sixth Amendment. Taylor  v. Lou-
isiana, 419 U.S.  522 (1975).
17 CHARLES  REMBAR,  THE  LAW  OF  THE  LAND:  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  OUR  LEGAL
SYSTEM  116-71  (1980).
-See  Marianne  Constable,  The Jury 'De Medietate  Linguae':  Changing Con-
ceptions of Citizenship,  Law, and Knowledge  (1989)  (unpublished Ph.D. thesis,
University of California  (Berkeley)).
9 Tracy L. Altman, Note, Affirmative Selection: A New Response to Peremptory
Challenge  Abuse, 38 Stan. L. Rev.  781,  787-93 (1986).
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at least  symbolic community  participation  in justice,  this cross-section
appearance provides the "likeness" version of representation, the resem-
blance  to  the  larger  community.
90  It  also  helps  promote  the  apparent
legitimacy  of the result. As one  commentator  put it,  "the jury is  not  a
scientific instrument  but rather  a body that, through  its diversity,  can
be fair."91
Besides the appearance  of fairness through representation, the cross-
sectional jury also promises to give insights based on the range of par-
ticular experiences that different kinds of people have. The film, "Twelve
Angry  Men" for  example,  suggests  how  a juror with the  same  kind  of
background  as the  defendant  could  bring knowledge  about  how  street
kids use switchblades.
92  Differences of gender, race, and ethnicity provide
for different  kinds of knowledge  relevant  to the tasks of a jury. In  this
conception, the dimension of representation that matters is not the formal
authorization  idea,  nor the  trusteeship,  but the  descriptive or portrait
representation.
9 3  Although  interests  of the  represented  group  may  be
germane  as well,  it  is as much  the interests  of the whole,  diverse com-
munity in being  mirrored aptly that is here at work. Moreover, the de-
liberative  process within  a  group  of diverse  members brings  the
community within the institution of justice.
By this theory, the prosecutor improperly  used peremptories to strike
all Hispanic and Spanish-speaking jurors in People  v. Hernandez.
94 Strik-
ing  otherwise  eligible jurors because  of their special  knowledge  under-
mines the purposes of bringing that special  knowledge into the process
and  also removes otherwise  eligible jurors because  of their ethnic iden-
tity.95
O  Id.
91  Id. at 790-91.
92 Id. at 791 n.50. In a different way, "Silence of the Lambs," a movie depicting
a serial  killer with insight into  how another  serial killer will  behave, suggests
how people may  understand others  like themselves.  However, I am unsure that
this calls  for  representation  of serial  killers  on  juries.  Insight  does  not  mean
judgment.
91  See supra n.41  (discussing Pitkin).  Thus  the descriptive  dimension  is
achieved as traits like race and ethnicity become proxies for the variety of persons
and knowledge in the society.
582 N.Y.S.2d  625 (N.Y. App.2d  1988).  The basic  doctrine  in the  field holds
that the defendant's  right to a fair and impartial jury does  not guarantee  "jury
of any particular composition," but instead that the jury be  drawn from "a source
fairly representative  of the community." Taylor  v. Louisiana, 419 U.S.  522,  538
(1975).  But see Batson  v.  Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79  (1986)  (which added to the mix
the  requirement  that  the  use  of peremptory  challenges  not  reflect  racially  or
ethnically discriminatory  purposes).
91  This was not the Supreme Court's  conclusion. A plurality  of the Court con-
cluded that the prosecutor offered a sufficiently race-neutral  explanation by not-
ing that the Spanish-speaking jurors might have difficulty accepting the English
translator's  version  of Spanish  testimony. Hernandez  v. New  York,  111  S.  Ct.
1859  (1991)  (Kennedy, J., plurality  opinion).  None  of the  opinions  in  the  case
explored the complex and partial relationships between ethnicity and fluency in
Spanish.
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Yet the critics of difference and empathy would shed contrasting lights
on this problem. Suspicion of abstract rules for favoring some groups over
others supports a challenge to the prosecutor's allegedly neutral reasons
for striking the Spanish-speaking jurors.  Fears that those jurors  would
not limit  themselves  to  the  official  translation  or  would attain  special
influence in the jury room sound neutral but have the effect of preferring
Anglos and disfavoring Hispanics.9 6 Any jury selection process, however
neutrally defined, that produces juries excluding people who look like the
defendant, exposes the process to the following questions:  how can these
people judge  someone unlike  themselves,  and isn't it time  for members
of the group to participate?97 These questions cast some doubt on the very
premise of the peremptory challenge.  In contemporary practice, the abil-
ity of the prosecution  and of the  defense  to  excuse  a number  of jurors
without stating a cause responds to a perceived need to screen out biased
jurors.9 8 One kind of presumed bias is that the juror has experiences  like
those of the defendant;  the fear here  is that the juror will be  unable to
judge objectively  if he or she  resembles the defendant. Critics respond:
why  is someone  so different likely  to be  objective?  Perhaps  the  very
grounds of difference  give rise to bias. If you exclude  all women  from a
jury  called  to judge  a  woman  charged with  killing  her  husband,  why
assume that men on the jury are objective?"  Moreover, even without bias,
someone quite different from the defendant may simply fail to understand
her experiences. Especially if the juror belongs to a group that in general
dominates the political and social worlds, that jury may lack awareness
of the perceptions  and motivations  of someone  outside that group,  and
may even lack tools to understand someone  so different.
The empathy inquiry may seem to cut in the opposite direction, but it,
too, gives grounds for questioning any peremptory challenges. It suggests
that people can and do act out of motives beyond their own self-interest,
and that people have capacities to empathize  with others. It  is not clear
how wide that capacity is, and whether it  can reach  across the kinds of
- Another effect  is to elevate  the English translation  - or representation  -
of the  evidence  over  the  Spanish  version. The  actual  effects  on the  outcome  if
Hispanics jurors participate in a criminal trial involving an Hispanic defendant
are hardly  obvious. Members  of the  same group may be tougher  than others  in
judging criminal matters. Yet they may also better understand excusing circum-
stances  or  more critically  evaluate  the  law enforcement  practices.  In addition,
diversity within the group called Hispanics renders predictions about their voting
patterns on a jury dubious.
91  These are the difference claims: how can you know, and we should speak for
ourselves.
91  Altman, supra note 89, at 795. Cf. Commonwealth  v. Local Union 542, Int'l
Union of Operating Eng'rs, 388 F. Supp. 115,  177 (E.D. Pa. 1974) ("Black lawyers
have litigated  in the  federal  courts almost exclusively  before white judges,  yet
they have not urged that white judges should be disqualified on matters of race
relations.").
See Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961). Historian Linda Kerber is exploring
the historical  context for the arguments in that case.
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differences that have come to matter in this society: race, ethnicity, gen-
der, class. But why permit a rule about peremptory challenges that would
presume that people cannot empathize across lines of difference? Not only
could such a rule be untrue to human possibilities; it might also be a self-
fulfilling prophesy.00
It remains fair to ask whether empathies run differently between people
who share those traits compared with people who do not.101 My tentative
answer  is:  I  don't  know. That  very  answer  supports  an  argument  for
preserving the fullest cross-section  possible and limiting  or ending per-
emptory challenges.  Only then can the full range of empathic and non-
empathic possibilities  be played  out. If the jury is to be representative,
it should represent this kind of social variety.
B.  Class Action Representation
The civil procedure rule that allows a group to serve as a party presents
the courts  with  the  difficulty  of representation:  who  can speak  for the
group and who can lead them or exemplify them  before the court? The
federal rule, and the rules of states that copy it, specifically require that
the parties selected  as representatives  be  typical of the group
1 0 2 and  be
able  to  demonstrate their  ability adequately  to  represent  the group. 1 0 3
This  element  often applies as much to  the parties'  ability  to secure at-
torneys who can provide adequate representation  for the class as it does
to  the named parties'  own representative  capacity.
04  Where  the repre-
sentation  is adequate and  the court certifies  the class,  a final judgment
100  See Altman, supra note 89, at  800  (discussing possibility  that people  are
more or less empathetic  in relation to rules and institutional expectations).
101  Sharing a trait does  not entail understanding one another even  in light of
that trait, much less in relation to other traits that are not shared.
102 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3).
103 FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (a)(4).
104 See, e.g.,  Goodman  v. Lukens  Steel  Co., 777  F.2d  113,  124  (3d Cir.  1985);
Susman  v.  Lincoln Am. Corp.,  561  F.2d 86,  90 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 942 (1980).  A special problem arises where an attorney who is a member of
the class seeks to be  its named representative  as well  as its counsel.  See Kelly
A. Freeman,  Note, Conflicts of Interest in Class Action Representation Vis-a-Vis
Class Representative and Class Counsel, 33  WAYNE  L. REv.  141  (1986).  Cf. Ox-
endine  v.  Williams,  509  F.2d  1405  (4th Cir.  1975)(non-lawyer  prisoner  denied
right to represent  others in pro  se  class action,  largely for  questions of compe-
tence).  See generally Derrick  Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and
Client Interests in School Desegregation  Litigation,  85  YALE  L.J.  470  (1976)  (ex-
ploring  potential  conflicts  in  goals  between  public  interest  lawyers  and  their
clients).
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binds all its members, for they are deemed to have had a fair opportunity
to be heard. 1 0 5
The  rule's demand  that the  class  representative  be  typical  seems to
adopt  one of Professor  Pitkin's types of representing:  the descriptive
standing for another, the mirror  providing  a likeness or portrait of the
others.'
06  Yet  with  adequacy of representation,  the rule seems  to have
opted for  a definition more concerned  with the kinds of action  the rep-
resentatives  can  and will  take;  what matters is not simply  their char-
acteristics but also their behavior as representatives  - and their lawyers'
ability and accountability  in that regard.
0 7 The  rule seems attuned to
the difference critique;  with adequacy  of representation it seems to con-
sider the empathy view that one may speak  for others  as members of a
group with shared interests in the absence of conflicting interests.08
Yet perhaps  most importantly,  both terms  show how the class  action
rule opts for some notion of representation. It is not enough for the rep-
resentative simply to be able to enforce legal rights for others.'0 0  It is not
enough merely to protect or advocate a legal interest. The representative
also must  be  free from  conflicting  interests. And  the representative  in
some way must stand for, symbolize, or depict the members of the class.
As  Professor Bryant Garth  has noted,  "A court presented  only with ar-
guments, not with the representatives of real constituencies, might ignore
the interests and  views of what might be a majority of a lawsuit's ben-
eficiaries.'' 0 Part of the advocacy, part of the right to be heard seems  to
include the presentation and representation of actual people who in some
important way look like those they represent. That resemblance may serve
as a proxy or predictor for who is likely to share interests or have access
to knowledge about the interests of the others. But that resemblance may
,o  See Deborah Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV.  1183, 1192  (1982).  This  article  provides  a comprehensive  analysis  of the  special rep- resentation  problems  presented  where  a  class  includes  potentially  conflicting interests and of procedural mechanisms for dealing with the problem of discerning the  views of a  large class. For a proposal  for an exception  to the attorney-client privilege  to help absent class members enforce  the representational obligations
of named parties, see Note, The Attorney-Client  Privilege in Class Actions: Fash- ioning an Exception to Promote Adequacy of Representation,  97 HARV.  L. REV. 947
(1984).
106 See supra note 47 (discussing Pitkin's theory of standing for as a descriptive
representative).
107  See supra note  51-2 (accountability  and action as  dimensions of represen-
tation).
"I'  Especially  for defendant classes, some  have proposed that those shared in- terests should predate the litigation itself. See Scott P. Miller, Note,  Certification of Defendant Classes Under Rule 23(b)(2), 84 COLUM_  L. REV.  1371,  1395  (1984). '0 Bryant Garth, Conflict and Dissent in Class Actions: A  Suggested Perspec-
tive, 77  Nw. U. L. REV.  492,  503  (1982).  Even an argument  for eliminating class representatives concludes  by recommending a continued role for "exemplary class members."  See Jean W. Burns, Decorative Figureheads:  Eliminating Class Rep- resentatives in Class Actions, 42 HASTINGS  L.J. 165,  194-95  (1990). "(I  Garth, supra note  109,  at 520.
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be important separately  for  the symbolic effect  in the represented com-
munity and in the fora where  they perform their representative tasks.
I think that this dimension helps to explain some court decisions such
as Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc."' There  a black  man who
had been discharged from employment sought to represent a class of "all
similarly situated Negroes seeking  equal employment  opportunities"  in
a  case claiming that the employer discriminated on the basis of race not
only in discharges,  but also in  hiring, promotion, and the  operation  of
segregated  facilities. The  trial court rejected  this broadly  defined class
and restricted the class to those persons discharged because of their race.
The appeals court reversed and allowed the broad class, reasoning that
the allegations  of racial discrimination  throughout the employer's prac-
tices was sufficiently  common to, and typical of, the claims of the broader
class.  It  acknowledged  that the named  representative might not be ad-
equate to speak for class members whose injury arose not from discharge
but from  other employment  practices, but the  reviewing  court did not
conclude  that this  factual  and legal  difference  would render  the dis-
charged party an inadequate representative. The common trait of mem-
bership in the minority racial group apparently  stood out in the court's
mind as the salient factor justifying both the broad definition of the class
and the possible representation by the discharged party. The trait of racial
minority membership,  I suggest, would allow that individual to stand for
all others claiming discrimination, albeit a variety of discriminations, on
the basis  of race.
112 The Supreme  Court has subsequently  rejected  this
kind of "across-the-board"  class,' 
3 and I wonder whether this reflects  a
failure to understand symbolic and depiction aspects of representation.
How would the "across-the-board"  class, represented  by  someone  who
shared only the trait of minority race membership, survive the difference
critique and the empathy inquiry? Many difference theorists are currently
engaged in  questioning whether  shared racial membership  alone repre-
sents a real and significant similarity, or whether talk of the perspective
of blacks,  or  even  the  perspective  of black  women,  obscures  the  "rich
diversity" existing among people who can be identified that way.
1
14 Pro-
fessor Patricia  Hill Collins has defended  the notion of a black feminist
standpoint to encompass  "the plurality of experiences"  that nonetheless
also include  "a distinctive set of experiences  that offers a different view
of material  reality  than that available  to  other groups."
115 The  fact  of
417 F.2d  1122 (5th Cir. 1969).
"'  But see General Telephone  v. Falcon,  626 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1980),  vacated
in part and remanded, 457 U.S. 147  (1982)(rejecting  class certified  to represent
both employees  denied promotion  and applicants  denied employment).  See also
Watson  v. Forth Worth Bank  & Trust, 798  F.2d 791  (5th Cir.  1986)  (approving
the splitting into two classes of employees  and applicants).
113  See George  M. Strickler, Jr., Protecting the Class: The Search for the Ade-
quate Representative in Class Action Litigation, 34 DEPAUL  L. REV.  73  (1984).
114 Patricia  Hill  Collins,  The Social Construction of Black Feminist Thought,
14  SIGNS 745, 747 n.8 (1989).
" Id. at 747 & n.8.
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subordination is  critical  to her identification  of a black feminist stand-
point. She acknowledges social class variations that help explain why not
all African-American  women  share  the  standpoint  she articulates.116
Nonetheless, membership in a racial minority stands as a symbol of his-
toric subordination which, for some purposes, should count as a basis for
adequate  representation.
1 17  I  think  the same  could  be  argued  for sex,
although the courts  have often viewed racial differences  among  women
as salient enough  to deny class representative  status to  a black women
for a class of white and black  women.118
What  about  the  empathy  inquiry? 19 The  Supreme  Court  itself has
permitted the certification of a class whose representative  no longer has
a live,  viable claim  to match  the claims  of the represented  class.
120  In
these cases, the Court emphasized not only that the class representative
116  Id.
"I Similarly,  one court  approved a  woman  as  a representative  in a  sex dis-
crimination  class although the named  representative  also held  a position  as an
officer  in the defendant  corporation, apparently on the grounds that the position
was only honorary. Rossini v. Ogilvy & Mather, Inc., 798 F.2d 590 (2d. Cir. 1986).
Perhaps the court approves the woman as a representative because sex is thicker
than job titles.
118  May black women serve as class representatives  in law suits asserting both
race  and sex  discrimination?  See  Kimberl  Crenshaw,  Demarginalizing  the In-
tersection of  Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination  Doc-
trine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989  U. CHI.  LEGAL F. 139,  143-
44. In applying the class action rule to refuse this class representative  status to
black women,  several courts remain vulnerable  to the difference  critique.
110  Interestingly, Professor Collins also identified the ethic of caring for others,
including the capacity for empathy, as elements of an alternative, African-Amer-
ican feminist epistemology. Collins, supra note 114, at 765-68. This suggests that
although tensions  between difference  critiques and empathy  critiques exist, so
do important  points of specific connection.  The  development  of a black feminist
epistemology partly reflects a difference critique attacking feminism for assuming
that all women  share something  as women.  See ELIZABETH  V. SPELMAN,  supra
note 67.  Collins notes how  the commitment  to  caring is a point of convergence
between white and black feminists. Collins, supra  note 114, at 768. Yet, this point
begins to raise questions about what exactly is the meaning of claims that "caring"
is specific  to the African-American  feminist viewpoint.
120 See United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S.  388 (1980)(named
plaintiff allowed to appeal the denial of class certification even after his own claim
had become moot);  Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975)(permitting class to proceed
although the named plaintiff had already satisfied the residency requirement and
obtained a divorce  and  so no  longer had a live claim against the state  one-year
residency  requirement  for a divorce);  McCoy v.  Ithaca  Housing Authority, 559
F.Supp. 1351 (N.D. N.Y. 1983)(class action can proceed even though part of named
plaintiffs claim became moot). See generally  C. Douglas Floyd, Civil Rights Class
Actions  in the 1980's: The Burger Court's Pragmatic Approach to Problems of
Adequate Representation and Justiciability,  1984  B.Y. U.  L.  REV. 1, 31-44.  Dif-
ferent concerns  arise  where the  named plaintiff seeks  damages  while  the class
seeks equitable  relief, for a conflict of interest appears when the defendant offers
to the named plaintiff a cash settlement or a settlement precluding further action
by the class.  See Williams v. Vukovoch,  720 F.2d  909 (6th Cir.  1983);  Franks v.
Kroger, 649 F.2d 1216 (6th Cir. 1981); Robert P. Schuwerk, Future Class Actions,
39 BAYLOR  L. REV.  63, 198 (1987).
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had no conflicting  interest with the class,
1 2' but also that the represen-
tative could  actually  competently  urge  the interests of the  class,  even
while lacking an actually identical claim. 122 In one case, the Court went
further and characterized the named representative as a "private attorney
general.'
23  If the reference  to "attorney general" means anything in  this
context, it includes the respect for someone entrusted with pursuing the
legal rights of others  even without needing  to have an actual personal
claim.' 24 It also means the possibility of empathy, proper incentives and
resources.
12 5
Yet,  in each of these instances, the named representative had at one
time been a member of the class or experienced the kind of injury alleged
by the class as a whole. That historical experience  may be irrecoverable,
but still the individual can remain a class representative. Thus, one court
approved  as  a  class  representative  for  a  law suit  challenging the  em-
ployer's maternity  policy  a woman  who had been sterilized.' 26 She had
once been able to become  a mother, and that was enough to allow her to
serve as a representative of mothers. The possibility of empathy without
a common historical experience  is not regarded by the courts as adequate
for representation. Thus, the Eleventh Circuit recently approved the dis-
trict court's denial of class certification where the named plaintiff for the
proposed  class  of Haitian  citizens  facing  United  States deportation  or
exclusion proceedings  or seeking  political  asylum in the United States
did  not allege that he  himself was  a member  of that  class. 27 Instead,
noted the appellate  court, "He  is  an  attorney  who  represents  Haitians
facing action by the INS.' 28
121  Sosna v. Iowa,  419 U.S. at 403.
122 Id.
122  United States  v. Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S.  at 403.
124  See Strickler, supra note  113, at 144-45.
1"5  Id. This notion is also compatible  with  the view of litigation as a form  of
expression  and political action.  See  NAACP  v. Button, 371  U.S.  415  (1963)  and
In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978),  in which groups and organizations may become
involved in litigation that actually focuses on a smaller number of actual litigants.
Derrick  Bell has criticized  this particular dimension of school desegregation  lit-
igation. Bell, supra note 104. This criticism has prompted  sustained debate since
its publication.
126  Association  of Flight Attendants  v. Texas  Int'l Airlines,  89  F.R.D.  52,  62
(S.D. Tex.  1981).  The court did not consider whether  this individual  retained  a
live  interest  in the  maternity  policy  should  she  adopt,  nor whether  the  policy
covered  adoption.
127  Ray v. United States Dept. of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization  Serv-
ice and State Department, 908 F.2d 1549,  1558 (1lth Cir. 1990). The court did not
therefore pursue  an argument  empathy advocates would advance: that empathy
can  arise even in the absence  of an  identical experience  and they would defend
as  a  representative  someone  who  both wants to  care  and  demonstrates  under-
standing of those needing representation.
12 Id. at 1558.
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Thus, the  difference  and empathy  critics  converge  in  supporting  the
approval  of class  representatives  who  share social  and historical  char-
acteristics  of past experience with the  class, even  if the representative
no longer has the same experience or same legal claim. This underscores
the  significance  of the  depiction  and  symbolic  dimensions  of represen-
tation, alongside evidence that the representative can, in fact, adequately
advance the views and claims of the constituent group.
1 29 A representative
is sufficiently  like the class  if  the representative  actually  once had ex-
periences similar to those of the other class members.
C. Other Rules Of Representation
With more  time and space, I would now turn to more representation
issues.  Consider  preclusion  rules:  when  is  someone  adequately  repre-
sented  in  one law suit and therefore subsequently barred from bringing
a new lawsuit?
3 °
When is someone  an adequate fiduciary for a beneficiary? Is it  helpful
or harmful  to share interests or social  experiences  with the beneficiary
in making, for example, investment decisions  for a pension fund?
131
How should we judge the representation of clients by professional  such
as lawyers and doctors?  How should we judge the tactics pursued by the
client who wants a lawyer from his or her own  "group"?1
3 2  Is this a wise
tactic  or one  that undermines  professional  representation?  How  about
when  the client seeks  someone  from  a different  group,  such  as when a
man charged with rape seeks a woman defense attorney, or when a white
employer charged  with racial discrimination  seeks  a black  or hispanic
attorney? Are these legitimate and wise tactics or, instead, efforts to take
advantage of stereotypes and prejudice?
What about employment itself? Is being hearing-impaired an important
qualification for serving as the president of Galladette University, and if
so, why?
133 Does sharing a trait with one's students enable  service  as a
role model, an expert, or as a representative,  and if  so,  in  what sense?
129 Taking this point one step further, a distinguished civil rights lawyer has
noted that the disparity in socioeconomic circumstance  "between the average civil
rights attorney and the average client or class member in a civil rights case" can
"create problems in the relationship." Julius Chambers, Class Action Litigation:
Representing Divergent  Interests of Class  Members, 4 U. DAYTON  L. REV. 353, 355
(1979).  Chambers does not suggest that these problems rise to the level of chal-
lenging the adequacy  of representation  (which  covers the lawyer as well  as the
named  representative)  but  instead  urges  greater  attention to  this  problem  of
distance by the legal profession in general. Id.
130  See  Martin v. Wilks,  490 U.S.  755  (1989);  Hansberry  v.  Lee,  311  U.S.  32
(1940).
131 See generally BETTY  KRIKORIAN,  FIDUCIARY  STANDARDS  IN  PENSION  AND
TRUST  MANAGEMENT  (1989).
12 See supra note  34 (discussing deaf lawyer who  represented  a deaf student
in the Supreme Court).
133  See OLIVER  SACKS,  SEEING  VOICES  127-63 (1990).
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Are parents  in  any sensible sense representatives  of their children?'
4
Or are parents people with  interests separate  and conflicting  with their
children's interests and creating a need for independent representatives
for the children? Before you start to chuckle at the idea of a child bringing
her lawyer  over to meet her parents,  consider the problems posed when
parents seek to commit their children to mental hospitals, order them to
have an abortion, or seek to withhold medical treatment  from them.
IV.  INTERMISSION
Behind  all  the  representation  problems  I  have  discussed,  I  see  the
distrust of difference and the hope of empathy. These lie even deeper than
the concerns generated by "Miss Saigon"  and law school hiring. Beneath
the clashing assertions of essential differences  and meritocracy, and the
claims  of reparations  countered  by  hiring  freedom,  I  believe,  are  our
common  experiences: betrayal by those who claim to speak for us but do
not understand, and connection  with those who often seem so different.
Law, at its best, cannot resolve such deep conflicts. Law can only manage
them, temporarily.
For something more insightful, we need art. I cannot help but think of
another  contemporary  play:  "M.  Butterfly."'135 Playwright  David Henry
Hwang read a  New  York  Times account about an actual  affair between
a male French diplomat and a Chinese opera  singer who appeared to be
a woman but was actually a man. According to the New York Times story,
the actual  gender identity of the opera singer remained unknown to the
diplomat, and Hwang asked, how could this be? 36 In the news story, the
diplomat  said he had  never  seen his Chinese  lover  naked  and thought
"her" modesty reflected Chinese custom. Hwang explained his own bril-
liant chain of thought:
134  After longstanding tradition recognizing parents as representatives  of their
children for purposes of litigation, the Supreme Court denied a group of African-
American parents  standing  to sue  on behalf of their children  who  were denied
admission to private, tax-exempt  schools.  The Court reasoned  in part that any
stigma due  to  racial  discrimination  could be  challenged  only  by the individual
who was personally injured. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737,  757 (1984).
131  It  is the  longest running straight play  since  "Amadeus".  Kevin Kelly, M.
Butterfly, Miss Saigon, and Mr. Hwang, BOSTON  GLOBE,  Sept. 9,  1990, at 92.
131  Id. at 93.  In this way, the  play challenges  the audience  to think  not only
about the gender of the character, but also the gender  of the actor, and thus the
possibilities  of cross-gender  casting.  Cross-gender  casting, while  uncommon,  is
not without precedent. See Dan Sullivan, Colorblind  Casting: It's Not Yet a Tra-
dition- When  Black is  White, Women are Men, And the Theater is Challenging,
LA TIMES,  Oct. 2, 1988, Calendar Section, at 50.
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I thought, wait a minute here, that's not a Chinese custom?  I
begin to think, maybe the guy had not fallen  in love  with an
actual  person  but with this sort  of fantasy stereotype  of the
Orient. I was driving along one day, somewhere, thinking, hey,
the diplomat thought he had found Madame Butterfly! I pulled
into  a  record  store,  bought Puccini's  opera,  looked at the  li-
bretto, and, right there, in the store, I began to structure the
beginning of the play where the diplomat fantasizes  that he's
Pinkerton  and has found  Butterfly. He realizes  - by the end
- that he, himself, is, in fact, Butterfly. He's the one who has
been sacrificed  for love, exploited  by his lover, who turns out
to be a spy. Once I had all this, I  knew I could start writing at
the beginning and go through  to the end.'37
"M.  Butterfly"  teases  the  audience  about the  identity of the opera
singer. The playbill  lists  only  the actor's  last  name  and first initial to
keep the real person's  sex  a mystery. The play gradually, methodically,
and fantastically  explores the projection of fantasy on what we think is
different;  the projection of gender difference  on top of racial and national
difference,  in the  midst of searching for  human connection,  and in the
midst of the jeopardy of betrayal. It is critical to the play that the audience
suspend disbelief about who is the opera singer, who is the diplomat, and
ultimately, who  are we  all, struggling  to know  and be  known.  As this
play opens possibilities for new understandings, it exemplifies  represen-
tation: the representation  of human experience,  present and absent from
our  consciousness.  From Miss  Saigon,  to class  actions,  to M.  Butterfly,
representation  is changing even as it changes us.
137 Kelly, supra note  135, at 93.
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